Earlier today I saw @averagesecguy tweet a Python script for submitting random credentials to a phishing site. This got my attention as I have manually done this to some of my phishing group “BFF”s before.
It can be entertaining to submit a honey token credential to a phishing campaign against your organization. Follow up with a Splunk alert on the credential to monitor sources, maybe even take an Active Defense approach to them.
It got me thinking. How could I glue this together for a sit back and enjoy experience?
I have been working on a Splunk TA (technology add on) for openphish.com feeds. I’ve done automated response before in Splunk. I bet you see where this is headed.
- Take in the Openphish.com feed.
- Alert in Splunk on your Brand.
- Have the alert submit a random credential leveraging @averagesecguy’s script.
- Have the credential add to a Splunk KV store table for used honey credentials.
- Setup alerts and active response in Splunk based on any authentication hits on the KV store lookup.
- Grab the tartar sauce and enjoy.
- Maybe have the random honey credential submissions generate a modest number of submissions per phishing link. Only one and the bad guys might not use it amongst real ones obtained from your organization. Too many and they might notice and filter those out such as from same source IP.
- Conform the honey credentials to your organizations naming and password credentials. This will make them appear real compared to genuine credentials they capture for your organization.
- Make the submission mechanism use one or more appropriate source IPs for your Org. If its traceable to one single source IP the bad guys could filter on it.
- Make sure your pool of random credentials do not contain valid usernames of real users so your alert/automation don’t hit folks you care about.
- If you get into automating defensive action be sure to whitelist source IPs appropriately. It would be unpleasant if the bad guys tricked your defenses into shutting down traffic to things you care about.
- As we evolve our code maybe take into account the time discovered on phishing pages and don’t submit to all of them or if they are too fresh. This could reduce chances the Phishers are making a new site and seeing if the security team finds and hits it before they’ve had a chance to send it in a real phishing email blast.
- Account for source IPs for successful two factor associated logins for your employees. You might use Duo Security with Last Pass Enterprise as an example. That gives you source IPs you have high confidence are indeed your employees. You can tailor response to alerting vs active defense accordingly.
We know phishers use poor grammar to target the users most likely to fall for phishing. We can use this as a similar strategy. Target the less sophisticated phishers with some simple automation and alerting. You could spice it up by adding auto abuse reporting on the hosting of the phishing sites hitting our brand.
I will be trying out some coding on this. If I get it working reasonably well it will go up into my git repo as usual.